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Abstract
The Cuban government has implemented a series of agricultural transformations since 2007
to increase the country’s agricultural self-sufficiency and reduce its dependency on food
imports. These include the transfer (in usufruct) of State-owned land to non-State producers
(e.g. cooperatives and private farmers), moderate price reforms, the decentralization of
decision making, and the gradual relaxation of existing forms of agricultural
commercialization. As a result of these measures, the area planted, as well as physical
output and agricultural yields (in selected non-sugar crop categories) have shown mixed
results, but still remain below desired levels. There are three (3) fundamental unresolved
aspects that have prevented Cuba’s agricultural sector from achieving the desired outcomes:
(1) the need to achieve the “realization of property,” (2) the recognition and acceptance of the
market as a complementary economic coordination mechanism, and (3) the absence of a
systemic focus to achieve the successful completion of the agricultural production cycle.
These unresolved aspects should be addressed through: (1) the consolidation of input markets,
where producers can obtain essential inputs at prices that correspond to the prices they can
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obtain for their output, (2) greater autonomy to allow agricultural producers to freely decide
when, where, and to whom they could sell their output, after social contracts have been
fulfilled, (3) the diversification of the forms of agricultural commercialization to permit
greater participation by non-State economic actors, (4) allowing agricultural producers to
freely hire the labor necessary to sustain and increase production, and (5) providing
agricultural producers with the financing and technical assistance necessary.
Keywords: Agricultural transformations, Cuba, Cuban agriculture.
JEL Classifications: P15, P20, Q15, Q18.
1. Introduction
In its recent efforts to transform (or “update”) its economic model, Cuba has understandably
focused on its agricultural sector. Even though it only accounts for approximately 5% of
gross domestic product (GDP), agriculture represents a relatively large share of the Cuban
economy (some 20%) due to its direct linkages with other sectors and multiplier effect (Nova
González, 2006, 2013a, 2013b). Despite of the expansion of tourism and services, Cuba
still remains an agricultural country, and agriculture touches every aspect of the country’s
economic and social life.
The agricultural sector plays an important role in the Cuban economy due to various factors.
First, an important group of industries or sectors, such as sugar (including derivative
products), food, tobacco and beverages, which account for approximately 6.5% of the
country’s GDP, depend heavily on the raw materials or inputs supplied by the agricultural
sector.
Second, related activities, such as the transportation and commercialization of
agricultural products, and food processing, which account for about 10% of GDP, are also
dependent on the agricultural sector (Nova González, 2008). In total, close to 20% of
Cuba’s GDP is directly or indirectly related to the agricultural sector (Nova González,
2013b).
Cuba’s agricultural sector also plays an important role as a source of employment;
approximately 21% of the country’s economically active population works in agriculture. If
related activities, such the transportation, storage, and commercialization of agricultural
products, are included, the agricultural sector’s share of total employment increases
significantly (Nova González, 2014). Close to 4 million Cubans, or 80% of the labor force,
is either directly or indirectly related to agriculture (in terms of employment and economic
activities) (Nova González, 2008).
The agricultural sector also plays an important role as a supplier of renewable energy (Nova
González, 2008). This is primarily accomplished through generation of electricity, biofuels,
and biogas produced by the sugar agro-industry. Sugarcane plantations can absorb carbon
dioxide (CO2) and emit oxygen (O2). It is estimated that over the course of one year a
hectare planted with sugarcane can absorb about 60 tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) and emit
approximately 40 tons of oxygen (O2), resulting in the so-called “forest effect” (Nova
González, 2008).
Finally, as a consumer of raw materials, intermediate capital goods, and finished products,
Cuba’s agricultural sector has strong linkages with almost every sector of the economy.
These linkages, and high levels of coordination and integration, contribute to the
aforementioned multiplier effect (of the agricultural sector) and to its positive spillovers,
magnifying the economic and strategic importance of agriculture in the Cuban economy.
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Since the collapse of the Socialist Bloc and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early
1990s, Cuba’s agricultural sector has been affected by declining output levels, low labor
productivity, worker absenteeism, insufficient administrative coordination, excessive
bureaucratic controls, and increasing de-capitalization caused by shortages of investment
and foreign exchange receipts (Hagelberg, 2010; Spadoni, 2014). Cuban agriculture has
also been impacted by adverse weather conditions, particularly several devastating hurricanes
and a severe drought (2006-2008) and the effects of the U.S. trade embargo (González-Corzo,
Mesa-Lago, 2012; 2013; Nova González, 2013; Spadoni, 2014).
After Raul Castro’s official ascent to power on February 24, 2008, a series of policy measures
have been implemented to prioritize and reactivate this vital sector of the Cuban economy.
The most significant include: the approval of Decree Law No. 259 in 2008, which
facilitates the transfers of idle State-owned lands to private producers and agricultural
cooperatives, the transfer of some of the functions performed by the Ministry of Agriculture
(MINAGRI) to the Ministry of Interior Trade (MINCIN), the creation of a limited number of
State-operated establishments to sell basic agricultural inputs (e.g., seeds, fertilizer, work
gloves, machetes, axes, etc.) to small agricultural producers, experiments with “suburban
agriculture” to connect local producers and consumers and reduce fuel, transportation and
storage costs, and increases in the prices paid by Acopio, the State-run agricultural
procurement agency, to private farmers and cooperatives producing milk, beans, rice, and
other products.
This paper analyzes Cuba’s agricultural transformations since the process of “updating” its
socialist economic model was initiated in 2007. The first section presents a detailed account
of the principal agricultural reform measures implemented from the inception of the
“economic updating” process. This is followed by a comprehensive analysis of the structure
and performance of Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural sector, with a particular emphasis on key
metrics such as planted areas and areas under production, physical output, and agricultural
yields. Finally, the last section explores the principal elements of Cuba’s emerging
agricultural model and its prospects for the future.
2. Agricultural Transformations (2007 – Present)
Falling agricultural output, low yields, declining labor productivity, high levels of waste and
inefficiency, the rising costs of food imports, and the deterioration of the trade balance, have
placed food production at the forefront of the economic challenges confronting Cuba at the
present time (Hagelberg, 2010). According to official statistics, Cuba spent $2.0 billion on
imported food and agricultural products in 2013, representing 13.6% of the country’s total
merchandise imports for that year (Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información, 2014 ).
As it experienced the worst economic crisis since the collapse of the Eastern European
Socialist Bloc and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, and confronted
with a more favorable international environment, mainly as the result of its close economic
ties with Venezuela, China, and Canada, and its extended diplomatic relations with virtually
every country in the Western Hemisphere and other regions of the world, Cuba has
implemented a series of policy measures to transform its agricultural sector.
One of the first steps taken in this direction consisted of paying higher prices to producers of
certain agricultural products. This process was initiated in 2007, when the State
procurement agency, Acopio, increased the prices it paid milk producers as well as the
percentage paid in convertible pesos (CUC) per liter produced and delivered. In 2007, the
State increased the prices that its procurement agency, Acopio, paid to agricultural producers
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for a selected group of products. Rice prices, for example, increased from 1,931 Cuban pesos
(CUP) per ton in 2007 to 6,304 CUP by the end of 2013 (Spadoni, 2014). Similarly, the price
paid by Acopio to agricultural producers for potatoes rose from 544 pesos per ton to 652
pesos per ton between 2007 and 2013 (Spadoni, 2014); and the prices paid to milk and beef
producers increased from 900 pesos per ton to 5,218 pesos per ton, and from 2,450 pesos per
ton to 8,900 pesos per ton, respectively, during the same period (Spadoni, 2014). Higher
prices have incentivized agricultural producers to improved their output deliveries (or sales)
to Acopio, resulting in notable fuel savings and improved distribution to the State-operated
retail store network (Nova González, 2010).
The resulting increase in producers’ incomes resulting from this measure increased
producers’ capacity to obtain essential inputs to further increase production. (Nova González,
2010). These price increases allowed Acopio to recover a part of this production, which
previously had other destinations and producers have been encouraged to sell their product to
Acopio. This measure constitutes a direct stimulus to producers, and incentivizes them to
indirectly contribute to certain savings in fuel and loss reductions because of timely deliveries
made to Acopio. This procedure has been implemented in 89 municipalities, of which 66 are
fully self-sufficient. However, it has resulted in certain unintended consequences, which have
contributed to reductions in deliveries to industry, resulting in the under-utilization of the
country’s industrial capacity (Nova González, 2010)
Acopio also increased the prices it pays to meat and poultry producers. Payments in
convertible pesos (CUC) to meat and poultry producers have increased their purchasing
power, allowing many of them to obtain essential agricultural inputs in recently-created hard
currency stores for this purpose (there are stores in 70 of the 168 existing municipalities).
Unfortunately, these stores tend to offer a limited variety of inputs of about 64 products,
supply has been unpredictable and unreliable, and prices tend to be relatively high.
The second significant policy measure implemented to transform Cuba’s non-sugar
agricultural sector was the transfer of idle State-owned land to cooperatives and individual
producers after the approval of Decree-Law 259 in July 2008. The implementation of this
measure is somewhat paradoxical since there is a significant amount of idle lands (1,758,
962 hectares), a valuable human capital, a significant number of research centers and
experimental stations, with proven results, and available technology, but since the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Socialist Camp in the early 1990s, the Cuban
economy has been forced to import significant volumes of food, many of which can be
produced domestically under more favorable conditions.
Decree-Law 259 clarifies important aspects of Cuba’s most recent “agrarian reform,” the
conditions of usufruct under which idle State-owned lands will be transferred to cooperatives
and individual producers, the terms of economic ownership related to this property form, and
its relation to legal ownership (Nova González, 2010). It also helps to clarify important
aspects, which until recently, remained unclear or undefined such as the period of time for
which the usufruct is established, which helps define its economic ownership and legal
ownership, and the collection of taxes and rents by the State.
In addition, the Decree-Law 259 incorporates some elements that were not taken into
consideration in previous agricultural reform measures, such as the duration of transfers to
natural persons (10 years, renewable leases, regardless of the type of crop harvested), and the
transfers of land to legal entities such as cooperatives (Nova González, 2010). One
interesting feature that distinguishes Decree Law 259 from previous legislation is that the
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terms of the usufruct, or lease agreements, are standardized for specific periods regardless of
the types of crops produced, the modes of production used to generate this output, and
whether or not the crops are considered short-cycle or long-cycle, and the type of livestock
raised by producers (Nova González, 2010).
The degree of investment intensity related to agricultural production varies according to the
type of crop produced, or the type of livestock raised. Some products and forms of livestock
are more labor and capital intensive than others, and due to their seasonal nature require
different quantities of labor and physical and financial capital Pursuant to Article 15 (of
Decree Law 259), once finalized, the terms of the usufruct allow producers to receive
payment or compensation from the State for bienhechurias, or infrastructure or physical
improvements to the land and facilities used for production, with the exception of housing
built by individual producers or cooperatives. This constraint or limit provides a distorted
incentive to make the minimum investment required, prevents the agricultural producers
permanently settling in their newly acquired lands (leased from the State), and explains why
most of them despite the positive advances made by Decree Law 259, consider themselves as
transient (non-permanent) producers. In reality, as Nova González (2009, 2010) indicates, the
successful transformation of Cuba’s agricultural sector requires the recampesinización, or the
re-population of the countryside; without significant and long-lasting increases in the quantity
of farmers, technicians, and administrative and managerial personnel dedicated to agriculture,
there is no guarantee and stability of a sustainable agricultural production (Nova González,
2009, 2010).
Cuba’s newly decentralized agricultural model must recognize that agricultural producers
require certain facilities to store and preserve the essential inputs, animals, seeds, supplies,
and equipment, among others. To stimulate the migration of labor from other areas of the
economy into agriculture, policies that provide economic incentives for investment in
physical infrastructure and promote long-term commitments to agriculture are being
contemplated. To ensure the success of this decentralized model of agricultural production,
where regional and local producers are expected to develop strong linkages with the land in
which they work, and consumers and suppliers in their respective “markets,” producers and
administrative and managerial personnel need to live near or on the locations where
production takes, a sense of permanence and consistency must be encouraged and developed,
and the linkages between producers and the lands in which production takes place must be
strengthened over time (Nova González, 2010).
By the end of 2009, some 920,000 hectares of idle State-owned lands had been transferred to
more than 100,000 applicants, representing 52% of the total (Nova González, 2010). Until
January 2010, there had been 121,711 applications, of which 98% are natural persons, of
which approximately 79% were previously landless (Nova González, 2010). At the present
time, it is estimated that 35% of the land delivered has been planted or cultivated (Nova
González, 2010). Considering the original conditions of the majority of this land, and the
wide range of challenges, constraints, and difficulties that non-State agricultural producers
still face, this is indeed a remarkable accomplishment.
Yet, despite the notable increases in the number of applications from both cooperatives and
individual producers, the transfer of idle State-owned lands to non-State producers has been
characterized by a series of bureaucratic hurdles and impediments, which still present serious
difficulties. According to the provisions of Decree Law 282, nine (9) documents are
required for processing of application for the transfer of land in usufruct (Nova González,
2010). To file a complaint or appeal, applicants are required to complete and submit
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thirteen (13) documents, and from the time the applicant files the application for the transfer
of land with the municipal director of the Centro Nacional del Control de la Tierra (National
Center for Land Control), the office has thirty (30) days to review the application, and draft
or prepare the required documentation, and up to sixty (60) days to conduct the necessary
surveys and medical examinations of the livestock to be transferred from State ownership to
the non-State sector (Nova González, 2010).Once the necessary documents are drawn, the
municipal director of the National Center for Land Control presents them to the municipal
delegate of agriculture in the term of three (3) days, and the latter has thirty (30) days to
review and approval of grant of the requested transfer in usufruct or requested (Nova
González, 2010).
Theoretically, it can take at least sixty-three (63) days, from the beginning of the application
to lease idle lands or livestock from the State for a predetermined period of time, under the
conditions previously described, until the formal documents are approved and issued,
assuming that process transpires normally and does not require additional field surveys or
measurements, and other bureaucratic steps or procedures. In such cases, the time needed to
clear existing bureaucratic hurdles and effectively transfer the land or livestock from the
State to the cooperative or private sectors can theoretically take ninety-three (93) days or
even longer.
Another important measure in Cuba’s road towards a more flexible and decentralized
agricultural model was the transfer of the collection activities, assigned to the State-owned
procurement agency, Acopio, to the Ministry of Domestic Trade (Ministerio del Comercio
Interior, MINCIN). For many experts in Cuban agriculture, this is considered as a road
already traveled. In 1976, procurement was transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture
(Ministerio de la Agricultura, MINAGRI), but then returned to it after the “Rectification
Process” (RP) in 1986. Transferring Acopio’s functions to the MINAGRI would be a more
logical and appropriate step to improve the operational and administrative efficiency of
Cuba’s cumbersome system of agricultural procurement (Nova González, 2010).
At the present time, Cuba’s agricultural procurement and marketing system is hindered by a
highly regulated market, the distortions related to monetary dualism, and insufficient output,
particularly by the cooperative sector (which includes the Unidades Básicas de Producción
Cooperativa, UBPCs, and the Cooperativas de Producción Agropecuaria, CPAs). Despite
recent efforts, the marketing function, which includes the distribution and exchange of
agricultural products, is characterized by delayed payments, insufficient collection capacity
on the part of Acopio, and the lack of material incentives and credit financing to stimulate and
incentivize production (Nova González, 2010).
Another key measure in the transformation of Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural sector has been
the decentralization and the restructuring of the functions of the ministries responsible for the
administration, implementation, and oversight of the country’s agricultural policies. The
municipality as an increasingly autonomous economic unit is as the center of this new
strategy. The newly-considered model of decentralized decision making identifies the
municipality as the principal actor responsible for making rational economic decisions and
implementing the required strategies within its territorial boundaries. At the present time,
each municipality has established a Municipal Delegation of agriculture (169 in total), which
is primarily responsible for managing the transfers of idle State-owned lands and State-owned
livestock to the non-State sector, to promote and stimulate the development of three (3)
“core” modalities of production: (1) urban agriculture, (2) suburban agriculture, which
covers a span of about 10 km from the periphery of cities and urban centers, and (3) and
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productive or conventional poles (Nova González, 2010). During the testing phase of this
model in 2010, the MINAG selected 16 municipalities plus the special municipality of Isla de
la Juventud, a total of 17, to carry across the combination of these three scenarios.
Participation was extended to all the entities that produce food in the municipality, whether or
not under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture (UBPCs, CCS, CPAs, State-owned
farms, etc.) (Nova González, 2010).
In addition, the Ministry of the Economy and Planning (MEP) has also selected five (5)
municipalities that are supporting financially and decentralized forms of economic
management, for investigation on solutions on the substitution of imports, export generated
funds, on the food and employment problem (Nova González, 2010). The MEP also
implemented a series of internal reforms to simply the State apparatus and structures that deal
or are in some ways related with the production, distribution, and consumption of agricultural
products.
The first step in this direction was the unification of the Ministry of the Food
Industry (Ministerio de la Industria Alimenticia, MINAL) with the former Ministry of
Fisheries after the approval of Decree-Law 287 and Decree-Law 294 in 2011.
Decree-287 also transferred some of the functions of the Sugar Ministry (MINAZ) to the
Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG) and to the Ministry of the Economy and Planning (MEP).
MINAG was assigned regulatory and supervisory functions such as managing land dedicated
to sugar production, enforcing industrial and environmental regulations, and overseeing the
commercialization of refined sugar and sugar derivatives. The MEP is now responsible for
managing State investments in the sugar sector, and the Ministry of Trade and Foreign
Investment (MINCEX) is responsible for implementing export policies and managing foreign
investment in agriculture.Decree-law 294 replaced the Ministry of Sugar (MINAZ) with a
holding company, Grupo Azucarero AZCUBA, responsible for managing all economic and
investment activities relates to the sugar Agro-Industry. AZCUBA is a diversified holding
company, comprised of twenty-five specialized subsidiaries, organized to manage sugar
production and exports.
The approval of Agreement 6853 on June 24, 2010 represented another important step in the
transformation of Cuba’s non-sugar agriculture sector. This policy measure authorizes the
commercialization (or trade) of agricultural products in roadside kiosks (or “points of sale”)
operated by agricultural cooperatives or state enterprises. Producers or their representatives
are authorized to sell their excess output, after their quotas to the state have been delivered
(or met) (Gaceta Oficial de Cuba, 2010). Agricultural producers or their representatives are
required to pay taxes and/or fees for the use of these kiosks (or “points of sale) as stipulated
by Resolution 206 issued by the Ministry of Prices and Finance. According to Resolution
206, sellers in the kiosks (or “points of sale”) established by Agreement 6853 are required to
pay a sales tax of 5%, based on their daily gross sales, plus a fee of 2% of the value of their
reported gross sales for the use of the kiosks and related facilities, and self-employed workers
(who work on these kiosks) are required to make social security contributions
(González-Corzo, 2013)
The approval of Agreement 6853 (2010) represents a step in the right direction. However,
certain provisions limit its potential. First, the entities or administrative units that
administer the kiosks (or “points of sale”) are a State-owned entity, which implies that the
State will continue to play a significant role in the administration of the important sales
venues. Second, producers that use these venues to commercialize their agricultural
products must first fulfill their delivery quotas to the State at prices and amounts established
by the latter. These conditions limit the autonomy of participants in the kiosks (or “points
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of sale”) in terms of determining output prices and quantity, and are likely to contribute to
imbalances between supply and demand.

The decentralization of Cuban agriculture was further expanded with the approval of
Resolution 90 by the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC), Resolution 122 by the Ministry of
Agriculture (MINAG), Resolution 369 by the Ministry of Finance and Prices, and Resolution
121 by the Ministry of Tourism (MINTOUR) in 2011. These policy measures facilitated the
decentralized commercialization of a selected group of agricultural products and Tourism
Enterprises; authorized non-state producers such as cooperatives and private farmers to sell
part of their output directly to such enterprises; and created a new entity, FINTOUR, S.A., to
provide credit financing to tourism enterprises engaged in direct commercialization with
participating agricultural producers (González-Corzo, 2013).
The approval of Decree-law 289 and Resolution 99 in 2011 formalized the extension of
agricultural credits (from state-owned Banks) to non-state agricultural producers,
representing another step towards a more flexible agricultural model. Decree 289 establishes
the legal framework for the provision of agricultural credits to non-state production units,
including self-employed workers, as well as for individuals wishing to obtain credit finance
for home improvements and repairs. Decree-law 289 allows self-employed workers and
private farmers earning more than 50,000 pesos (CUP) to open a business account; it also
lifted existing ceiling of 3,000 pesos (CUP) on bank loans to natural persons, and eliminated
the 100 convertible peso (CUC) limits on payments by State Owned Enterprises (SOES) to
self-employed workers, who provided goods and services to SOES, on a contractual basis
(González-Corzo, 2013).
Resolution 99, approved by the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC) in November 2011, authorized
the extension of bank-based credit financing (up to 500 pesos-cup) to non-state agricultural
producers (e.g. cooperatives and private farmers). Resolution 99 allows non-state agricultural
producers to obtain credit financing to purchase and repair equipment, procure inventory, and
obtain other essential inputs, including the costs of replanting and reconditioning
previously-planted fields (González-Corzo, 2013). Depending on the borrower’s
circumstances and the nature (or purpose) of the loan, it can be amortized using any source of
income, for periods of 18 to 60 months (González-Corzo, 2013).
The economic transformation of Cuba’s agricultural sector was accelerated after the
ratification of the “Guidelines” (“Lineamientos de la Política del Partido y la Revolución”)
after the 6th party Congress of the Communist Party (PPC) on April, 2011. As Nova González
(2013) indicates, Cuba’s Agricultural Sector confronts three (3) principal unresolved issues:
(1) the need to achieve the “Realization of Property,”1 the need to recognize (and accept) the
existence and role of the market, and the inexistence of a systemic strategy through the
productive cycle that would reflect its complex microeconomic and macroeconomic
interrelations.
Several policies responses have been recommended and discussed to address or resolve these
issues. These include: (1) the creation and development of input markets where agricultural
producers can obtain essential inputs and supplies, (2) granting greater autonomy to
agricultural producers, allowing them to decide how much output to produce, where to sell it
1

The concept of the “realization of property” refers to the right of producers to have complete autonomy in determining
output levels, choosing the final destination of their output, and determining its price; and having the ability to directly
access input markets to obtain the essential inputs to close the productive cycle (Nova González, 2013).
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and whom to sell it to, based on market conditions and social requirements, (3) facilitating
diverse forms of agricultural commercialization as an alternative to the State monopoly, (4)
allowing agricultural producers to freely hire labor, and (5) providing new and existing
agricultural producers with adequate financial and technical support (Nova González, 2013).
The Guidelines offer several proposals to address the aforementioned unresolved issues
confronted by Cuba’s agricultural sector. With regards to the creation of input markets where
agricultural producers will be able to obtain essential inputs, the “Guidelines” indicate that
such wholesale markets will be able to purchase or lease equipment, machinery, and other
essential inputs, with the objective of increasing producer autonomy, limiting State
intervention, and recognizing the participation of non-state forms of production (Nova
González, 2013).
With regards to prices, the “Guidelines” explicitly state that the State will retain full
discretion over price regulations, and prices will be established according to the plan (i.e.
prices will be centrally-determined), taking into account the social and economic functions of
the products and services for which prices will be centrally-determined by the State (Nova
González, 2013). At the same time, mechanisms that allow the creation other prices by the
Enterprise Sector will be approved, taking into account the interests of the nation, rather than
those of the enterprise, as well as sectoral and territorial considerations (Nova González,
2013). The Guidelines state that prices will be centrally-established in accordance with efforts
to “update” the country’s economic model (Nova González, 2013).
The Guidelines contain several contradictory provisions that hinder the development of a
more flexible system for the commercialization of agricultural products. Article 27, under
“Economic Procurement Model,” states that surplus agricultural production (i.e. production
above the State established quotas) cannot be sold directly to the population through
intermediaries; this provision hinders producer autonomy and limits their ability to achieve
“The Realization of Property” (Nova González, 2013). Conversely, Article 183 proposes the
transformation of the system of agricultural commercialization by simplifying the supply
chain between producers and consumers, including the possibility of allowing producers to
reach consumers through their own means (or resources) (i.e. via direct sales or
commercialization) (Nova González, 2013). Along similar lines, Article 304 aims to
restructure retail and wholesale agricultural commerce through more flexible arrangements in
order to simplify the linkages between producers and consumers, taking into account
economic conditions and the diversification of production and property forms (Nova
González, 2013).
The Guidelines also provide for greater producer autonomy with regards to hiring labour by
considering the expansion of employment in the non-state sector, as an alternative modality
closely aligned with emerging production and property forms. In that respect, the Guidelines
are closely synchronized with Resolution 32 and Resolution 33 of the Ministry of Labor and
Social Security (MTSS), which authorized a new form of self-employed agricultural worker
and regulate labor hiring practices by cooperatives and self-employed workers (Nova
González, 2013).
Finally, with regards to providing new and existing agricultural producers with adequate
financial support and training, Article 50 of the Guidelines identifies the implementation of
policies to support those activities that stimulate national production and the provision of
bank loans (or credit) to facilitate the expansion of the non-state sector as its principal goals
(Nova González, 2013). Other policy objectives include applying a differentiated tax regime
to stimulate agricultural production, the expansion of insurance programs to cover
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agricultural producers, and the development of specialized banking and financial services to
meet their needs, including non-state producers who received land in usufruct after the
approval of Decree-law 259 in 2008 (Nova González, 2013).
The approval of Decree-Law 300 on October 2012 expanded the principal provisions of
Decree-Law 259 (2008) with regards to the transfers of idle State-owned lands to non-State
producers (e.g., cooperatives and private farmers) in usufruct. Decree-Law 300 expanded
the maximum number of hectares that could be transferred to non-State producers (in
usufruct) to 67.1; it also permitted individual (or private) agricultural producers operating
under this new modality to become affiliated with cooperatives other than the Credit and
Services Cooperatives (CCS). Under Decree-Law 300 (2012), private farmers can also
associate themselves with Cooperatives of Agricultural Production (CPA) or Basic Units of
Cooperative Production (UBPCs); in addition, they are allowed to use alternative channels to
procure essential inputs and distribute their output, once delivery quotas with the State have
been fulfilled (González-Corzo, 2012).
In 2013, the Cuban government introduced several regulatory updates to further transform the
agricultural sector. These primarily consist of policy measures to expand the sales of
agricultural products to tourism enterprises, facilitate the direct commercialization of
agricultural products (on an experimental basis) in the provinces of Havana, Mayabeque, and
Artemisa, and restructure the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG). The approval of
Resolution 58 by the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG), Resolution 352 by the Ministry of
Finance and Prices, and Resolution 37 by the Ministry of Tourism (MINTUR) on September
2013 represent another step towards the transformation of the regulations governing the direct
sales of agricultural products to tourism enterprises in Cuba. These measures supplement
Resolution 122, which was approved in 2011. Their principal provisions include the
authorization of direct sales of agricultural products in Cuban pesos (CUP) to tourism
enterprises, without State intermediation, by all types of agricultural producers, including
individual (private) farmers, and the expansion of authorized products to include: fresh cut
flowers, gardening services, floral arrangements, dry spices, and eggs. According to
Resolution 9 (June 2013), prices can be directly determined by buyers and sellers. Resolution
9 also establishes the implementation of a “transaction fee” of 9 Cuban pesos (CUP) for
every convertible peso (CUC) generated from the direct sale of agricultural products to
tourism enterprises (by ALL types of agricultural producers). In accordance with
Decree-Law 112 (2012), Casa Financiera, S.A. and other financial and banking institutions
will collect a 5% (sales) tax payment from tourism enterprises.
The approval of Decree-Law 318 and Resolution 673 by the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG)
on October 2013 authorized the creation, on an experimental basis, of non-agricultural
cooperatives in some of the previous locations of the Mercados Agropecuarios Estatales
(MAEs) [State Agricultural Markets] in Havana, Artemisa, and Mayabeque provinces.
Nationwide expansion is planned by 2015. Their principal objective is to decentralize the
commercialization of agricultural products by facilitating the creation of “mercados de
abastos” (wholesale markets) where agricultural producers and or authorized intermediaries
can offer their products at wholesale prices. The approval of Decree-Law 318 and Resolution
673 represents the implementation of Lineamiento 181 (which basically proposed the
calibration between supply and demand in agricultural markets), and Lineamiento 183 (which
focused on steps to improve the commercialization of agricultural products). 2 These
2

The term “Lineamientos” refers to the “Lineamientos de la PolíticaEconómica y Social del Partido y la Revolución” – or
the “Social and Economic Guidelines of the Party and the Revolution” (commonly referred to as the “Guidelines”) –
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measures are applicable to ALL types of agricultural producers in the State and Non-State
sectors, including a new category of intermediary officially labeled as “carretilleros” (street
cart vendors). The principal provisions of Decree-Law 318 and Resolution 673 include:


The creation of Provincial Administration Councils responsible for implementing, and
overseeing policies, determining the location of retail outlets and zones of operation
for the “carretilleros,” and regulating direct sales of agricultural products to Centers
of Social Consumption such as hospitals, schools, daycare centers, dinning commons
(comedores), etc.



Beef, fresh milk, coffee, selected honey products, tobacco, and cocoa are excluded.
Potatoes are subject to “social consumption requirements” (defined by the State).



State producers (e.g., State farms, enterprises, etc.) are authorized to participate; the
same applies to Non-State producers such as UBPCs, CPAs, CCSs, private farmers,
and self-employed worker (a newly-authorized producer category).



Authorized agricultural products may be distributed in the following outlets:
Mercados Agropecuarios Estatales (MAEs), Mercados de Oferta y Demanda (MOD),
Mercados Arrendados (a newly-created outlet type leased by the State to Non-State
producers), Puntos de Ventas (stalls, or kiosks located in neighborhoods, rest stops on
the highway, etc.).3



Retail prices will be set by the Ministry of Finance and Prices for fixed price products;
producers that operate in MAEs that have been converted to non-agricultural
cooperatives can set their own prices, but these must be approved by the Ministry of
Finance and Prices.



As an initial part of the experiment, some MAEs will be converted into “mercados de
abastos” – located in Havana City only- which would allow enterprises and other
entities to buy agricultural products directly from State and Non-State producers.



Cooperatives that participate in these markets will be exempt from taxes for the first
three months; self-employed workers can also participate, but will receive a different
tax treatment (as part of the efforts to prioritized cooperatives, which are considered a
superior, and more socialized, property form).

The efforts to restructure the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG) announced in early 2014
represent another key element of Cuba’s agricultural transformations. These efforts are
divided into three (3) phases. The first phase consists of updating the MINAG budget
system. Phase two considers the creation of Provincial Enterprises (Empresas Provinciales)
and during phase three it is expected that the Provincial and Municipal Administrative
Councils will be phased out. The following measures are also planned: (1) transferring
Provincial Enterprises to Provincial Administration, (2), the consolidation of 15 existing
Agricultural Research Stations with similar institutions in the Ministry of Science,
Technology, and the Environment (CITMA).
3. Recent Performance (2007 - Present)
approved by the 6th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) on April 18, 2011. The “Guidelines” are the
framework that broadly delineates Cuba’s economic policies since the 6th Party Congress.
3
The retail agricultural outlets operated by the Youth Work Army (EJT) are excluded from Decree-Law 318, and will
continue to operate as in the past.
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Table 1 presents the distribution of land in Cuba at the end of 2013.

Table 1. Cuba: Land distribution based on tenure form, 2013 (thousand hectares)
Non-State Sector

Total
Agricultural Surface
Cultivated (or harvested) Surface
Non-agricultural Surface

Total

State
Sector

Total

UBPC

CPA

CCS and
Private
Farmers

10,988.4

5,932.1

5,056.3

1,952.0

614.3

2,490.0

6,342.4

1,851.7

4,490.7

1,677.5

521.5

2,291.7

2,645.8

471.8

2,174.0

851.3

264.9

1,057.8

4,646.0

4,080.4

565.5

274.5

92.8

198.3

Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información (2014).
As Table 1 indicates, Cuba’s arable land (or total agricultural surface) (6.3 million hectares
[ha]), represented 57.7% of the country’s total land (10.9 million ha). Approximately 41.7%
of the arable land was harvested (or under cultivation) in 2013. While the State sector holds
54% of Cuba’s total land (5.9 million ha), only 29.2% of arable land is held by the State (1.9
million ha), out of which 25.4% (472,000 ha) were harvested (or under cultivation) at the end
of 2013 (Table 1).
The non-State sector, which includes the Basic Units of Cooperative Production (Unidades
Básicas de Producción Cooperativa, UBPC), Cooperatives of Agricultural Production
(Cooperativas de Producción Agropecuaria, CPA), Credit and Services Cooperatives
(Cooperativas de Créditos y Servicios, CCS) and private farmers (privados), has seen its
share of total land, arable land (or agricultural surface), and land under cultivation increase
significantly since 2008 (Table 1). At the end of 2013, 46% of Cuba’s total land (5 million
ha), and 70.8% of the country’s arable land (4.5 million ha) were held by the non-State sector.
Close to half (48.4%) of the arable land (2.2 million ha) held by the non-State sector were
harvested (or under cultivation), representing 84.6% of the country’s area under cultivation
(2.6 million ha) (Table 1).
Table 2 shows the areas planted and under production for selected crops in Cuba’s non-sugar
agricultural sector during the 2008-2013 period.
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Table 2. Cuba: Areas planted and under production, selected crops, hectares.
CROPS

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Chg.

% Chg.

Viandas
Roots and tubers
Potato
Boniato

279,752
196,122
9,789
58,934

352,452
246,033
12,480
78,496

363,041
243,834
8,671
79,792

295,844
200,993
7,365
45,638

271,957
190,725
6,375
47,522

297,326
228,507
4,941
48,273

17,574
32,385
-4,848
-10,661

6.3%
16.5%
-49.5%
-18.1%

Malanga
Plantains
Bananas
Plantains
Vegetables
Tomato
Onions
Pepper
Cereals
Rice
Corn
Legumes
Beans
Tobacco
Citrus Fruits
Oranges
Grapefruit
Lemon
Other Fruits
Mangoes

26,581
83,630
23,413
60,217
259,073
62,124
11,056
6,969
284,736
155,514
129,222
95,306
95,306
23,048
45,635
30,628
13,207
898
83,058
24,972

27,027
106,419
33,034
73,385
278,561
69,170
11,586
7,227
419,732
215,751
203,981
150,584
150,584
24,861
47,921
31,907
12,424
1,116
91,662
37,276

19,795
119,207
27,152
92,055
236,569
49,057
9,766
5,797
402,037
176,429
225,608
112,712
112,712
20,256
43,149
26,046
13,075
879
96,890
30,790

16,242
94,851
28,474
66,377
211,610
54,955
10,713
5,618
351,364
208,046
143,318
123,914
123,914
13,631
33,391
18,988
11,093
836
80,781
29,531

15,305
81,232
18,135
63,097
202,897
49,009
9,175
6,311
356,261
202,708
153,553
123,434
123,434
16,130
26,155
13,500
9,895
754
79,439
29,961

16,400
68,819
13,638
55,181
214,026
54,286
11,620
7,825
375,996
197,824
178,172
119,775
119,775
12,906
20,290
11,222
7,605
656
83,472
30,585

-10,181
-14,811
-9,775
-5,036
-45,047
-7,838
564
856
91,260
42,309
48,950
24,469
24,469
-10,142
-25,345
-19,406
-5,603
-242
414
5,613

-38.3%
-17.7%
-41.7%
-8.4%
-17.4%
-12.6%
5.1%
12.3%
32.1%
27.2%
37.9%
25.7%
25.7%
-44.0%
-55.5%
-63.4%
-42.4%
-26.9%
0.5%
22.5%

Guava

10,116

13,035

11,660

8,525

8,704

10,093

-23

-0.2%

Papaya
Cocoa

4,406
3,800

5,427
5,089

7,979
5,114

5,800
5,153

5,824
4,203

6,186
4,303

1,781
503

40.4%
13.2%

(a)

(a)

Includes Roots and Tubers and Plantains.

Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información (2014).
As Table 2 indicates, between 2008 and 2013, the areas planted and under production increased
in five (5) out of the nine (9) categories of non-sugar agricultural crops reported by the National
Statistics Office as follows: viandas (6.3%), cereals (32.1%), legumes (25.7%), other fruits
(0.5%), and cocoa (13.2%). Conversely, during the same period, the areas planted and under
production declined in the following crop categories: plantains (-17.7%), vegetables (-17.4%),
tobacco (-44%), and citrus fruits (-55.5%) (Table 2).
Table 3 shows physical output levels for selected (non-sugar) crops in Cuba during the
2008-2013 period.
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Table 3. Cuba: Non-sugar agricultural production, selected crops, tons.
CROPS
Viandas

(a)

Roots and tubers
Potato
Boniato
Malanga
Plantains

2010

2011

2012

2013

Chg.

% Chg.

2,150,700

2,236,000

2,250,000

2,280,000

2,337,000

2,239,000

88,300

4.1%

1,392,500

1,565,600

1,515,000

1,445,000

1,452,000

1,580,500

188,000

13.5%

196,100

278,600

191,500

165,600

130,933

106,700

-89,400

-45.6%

375,000

437,100

384,743

311,900

335,319

396,347

21,347

5.7%

240,000

199,400

137,400

132,100

153,782

185,922

-54,078

-22.5%

758,200

670,400

735,000

835,000

885,000

658,500

-99,700

-13.1%

280,800

245,400

249,200

250,000

195,496

150,336

-130,464

-46.5%

Plantains

477,400

425,000

485,800

585,000

689,504

508,164

30,764

6.4%

2,439,300

2,548,800

2,141,035

2,200,000

2,112,000

2,406,500

-32,800

-1.3%

Tomato

575,900

750,000

517,040

601,000

557,100

678,000

102,100

17.7%

Onions

128,100

131,300

111,737

143,500

118,244

126,876

-1,224

-1.0%

Pepper

63,677

56,672

44,545

55,057

62,202

73,336

9,659

15.2%

Cereals

761,700

868,400

778,863

920,400

1,002,000

1,098,800

337,100

44.3%

Rice

436,000

563,600

454,400

566,400

641,600

672,600

236,600

54.3%

Corn

325,700

304,800

324,463

354,000

360,400

426,200

100,500

30.9%

97,200

110,800

80,439

133,000

127,100

129,800

32,600

33.5%

97,200

110,800

80,439

133,000

127,100

129,800

32,600

33.5%

21,500

25,200

20,500

19,900

19,500

24,000

2,500

11.6%

Legumes
Beans
Tobacco
Citrus Fruits

391,800

418,000

345,000

264,500

203,700

166,900

-224,900

-57.4%

Oranges

200,400

261,000

178,263

122,900

93,837

85,110

-115,290

-57.5%

Grapefruit

166,100

121,500

137,660

112,000

84,741

63,979

-102,121

-61.5%

Lemon

5,400

8,300

6,060

6,600

6,475

5,025

-375

-7.0%

738,500

748,000

762,045

817,000

964,900

925,000

186,500

25.3%

228,700

269,300

203,595

185,000

286,385

285,526

56,826

24.8%

Guava

126,500

84,900

71,581

85,000

103,191

124,964

-1,536

-1.2%

Papaya

89,400

95,700

135,707

135,000

178,558

197,842

108,442

121.3%

1,100

1,387

1,709

1,510

2,027

1,425

325

29.5%

Other Fruits
Mangoes

(a)

2009

Bananas
Vegetables

Cocoa

2008

Includes Roots and Tubers and Plantains.

Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información (2014).
Production in six (6) of the nine (9) reported categories of (non-sugar) crops increased as
follows during the 2008-2013 period: viandas (4.1%), cereals (44.3%), legumes (33.5%),
tobacco (11.6%), other fruits (25.3%), and cocoa (29.5%). These output levels, however, were
significantly lower than in 1989, the last year before the onset of the “economic crisis of the
1990s” and the disintegration of the Socialist Camp and the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.
By contrast, output declined in the following three (3) crop categories during the same period:
plantains (-13.1%), vegetables (-1.3%), and citrus fruits (-57.4%) (Table 3). The variability of
physical output in Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural sector between 2008 and 2013 was attributed
to several factors such as adverse weather conditions (e.g. drought, hurricanes), difficulties in
obtaining essential agricultural inputs, existing limitations with regards to the “realization of
property” (as discussed earlier), price controls, problems an inefficiencies related to the
commercialization of agricultural products, insufficient warehousing and storage capacity,
logistical difficulties associated with the transportation and cold storage of agricultural
products, soil erosion and degradation, insufficient irrigation capabilities, and other
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administrative, organizational, and structural problems (Mesa-Lago, 2012; Nova González,
2013a; Spadoni, 2014).

Agricultural yields for selected (non-sugar) crops during the 2008-2013 period are shown on
Table 4.
Table 4. Cuba: Agricultural yields, selected crops, tons per hectare
CROPS

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Viandas
Roots and tubers
Potato
Boniato

7.69
7.10
20.03
6.36

6.34
6.36
22.32
5.57

6.20
6.21
22.09
4.82

7.71
7.19
22.48
6.83

8.59
7.61
20.54
7.06

7.53
6.92
21.59
8.21

Malanga
Plantains
Bananas
Plantains
Vegetables
Tomato
Onions
Pepper
Cereals
Rice
Corn
Legumes
Beans
Tobacco
Citrus Fruits
Oranges
Grapefruit
Lemon
Other Fruits
Mangoes

9.03
9.07
11.99
7.93
9.42
9.27
11.59
9.14
2.68
2.80
2.52
1.02
1.02
0.93
8.59
6.54
12.58
6.02
8.89
9.16

7.38
6.30
7.43
5.79
9.15
10.84
11.33
7.84
2.07
2.61
1.49
0.74
0.74
1.01
8.72
8.18
9.78
7.44
8.16
7.22

6.94
6.17
9.18
5.28
9.05
10.54
11.44
7.68
1.94
2.58
1.44
0.71
0.71
1.01
8.00
6.84
10.53
6.89
7.87
6.61

8.13
8.80
8.78
8.81
10.40
10.94
13.39
9.80
2.62
2.72
2.47
1.07
1.07
1.46
7.92
6.47
10.10
7.89
10.11
6.26

10.05
10.89
10.78
10.93
10.41
11.37
12.89
9.86
2.81
3.17
2.35
1.03
1.03
1.21
7.79
6.95
8.56
8.59
12.15
9.56

11.34
9.57
11.02
9.21
11.24
12.49
10.92
9.37
2.92
3.40
2.39
1.08
1.08
1.86
8.23
7.58
8.41
7.66
11.08
9.34

Guava

12.51

6.51

6.14

9.97

11.86

12.38

Papaya
Cocoa

20.29
0.29

17.63
0.27

17.01
0.33

23.28
0.29

30.66
0.48

31.98
0.33

(a)

(a)

Includes Roots and Tubers and Plantains.

Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información (2014).
Between 2008 and 2013, agricultural yields increased in seven (7) out of the nine (9) crop
categories shown on Table 4. These were: plantains, vegetables, cereals, legumes, tobacco,
other fruits, and cocoa. However, yields for viandas and citrus fruits decreased slightly during
the same period.
4. Towards a New Agricultural Model
Despite representing only about 5% of GDP, due to its indirect economic contributions,
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positive externalities (or “spillover effects”), and strong linkages with the rest of the economy,
agriculture plays a key role in the Cuban economy (Nova González, 2013a). Cuba’s
agricultural sector is also an important source of employment, a significant consumer of raw
materials, intermediate, and finished goods, and one of the country’s principal generators of
renewable energy (Nova González, 2008).
Since the onset of the “economic crisis of the 1990s,” following the disappearance of the
Eastern European Socialist Bloc and the former Soviet Union, Cuban agriculture has been
affected by declining production levels, higher external sector dependency, and increased hard
currency expenditures to finance growing agricultural imports (Nova González,
2013a;González-Corzo & Nova González, 2013). Starting in 2007, the Cuban government
has implemented a series of economic transformations to increase domestic agricultural
production and reduced the country’s dependency on agricultural imports and is food and
agricultural vulnerability. These include structural and administrative transformations such as
the transfers of idle State-owned lands (in usufruct) to non-State producers, moderate price
reforms, the decentralization of decision-making and administrative functions, the
consolidation of several Ministries responsible to agricultural policies and regulation, and
gradual (experimental) transformations with regards to the commercialization of agricultural
products (Mesa-Lago, 2012; Spadoni, 2014). So far, the most significant of these reform
measures has been the transfer (in usufruct) of fallow State-owned lands to cooperatives and
private farmers after the approval of Decree-Law 259 in 2008 and Decree-Law 300 in 2012
(Nova González, 2013a).
Official Cuba agricultural statistics show that there was mixed results in terms of the area
planted and under production, and physical output between 2008 and 2013 (Tables 2 and 3).
While both variables increased in some crop categories during this period, they decreased in
others, indicating that the policy transformations initiated in 2007 had mixed effects. A
simple linear regression conducted by the authors, using 2008-2013 data, to analyze the
relationship between agricultural production (the dependent variable) and the area planted and
under production (the independent variable) produced a correlation coefficient of 0.774
suggesting a strong (positive) linear relationship between these two variables. Our
regression results also showed a coefficient of correlation (R2) of 0.599, indicating that close to
60% of the variation of the dependent variable (i.e. agricultural production) around the mean
can be explained by the variation in independent variable (i.e. the area planted and under
production). We believe that one of the key takeaways from these findings, which were
statistically-significant at the 5% level, is that one of the palpable effects of Cuba’s recent
agricultural transformations seems to be the reallocation of land to the production of selected
crop categories, as the country advances towards a new agricultural model.
Cuba’s agricultural sector is comprised of State and non-State producers. The latter category
includes the UBPCs, CPA, CCS, and private farmers. Under Cuba’s new agricultural model,
non-State producers account for a growing share of the country’s agricultural output. While
CCS and private farmers hold about 36% of the country’s agricultural surface (or arable land),
the produce close to 60% of its total agricultural output. According to Nova González (2013a),
these non-State producers account for 56% of total cow milk production, compared to just 15%
in the case of the State sector. Combined, the CCS and private farmers own more than 50% of
the total cattle herd and 56% of the milk-producing cattle, and 59% of the total pork live stock
in Cuba (Nova González, 2013a).
The importance of the non-State sector in Cuban agriculture has also grown in terms of its
share of total employment, and overall contributions to and participation in the Cuban
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economy (Nova González, 2013a; Spadoni, 2014). Approximately 20% of Cuba’s economy is
directly or indirectly related to agriculture; an estimated 80% of the economically-active
population is directly or indirectly involved in economic activities related to agriculture; and
several key sectors of the economy, such as food processing, light industry, and transportation
are strongly-connected to the agricultural sector (Nova González, 2013a).
There are three (3) fundamental unresolved aspects that need to be addressed, which have
significantly limited the impact of the agricultural transformations initiated in 2007. These
are: (1) the need to achieve the complete (or full) “realization of property,” (2) the necessity to
recognize and accept the existence of the market and its complementary role in the
coordination of economic activities, and (3) the absence of a systematic approach across the
entire agricultural production-consumption cycle to strengthen micro and macroeconomic
linkages (Nova González, 2013a).
These unresolved aspects should be addressed or resolved through the gradual implementation
of policies that facilitate the consolidation of input markets, where agricultural producers can
obtain or procure essential inputs at prices that correspond to the prices they can receive for
their output. Policies that allow agricultural producers to determine output levels and the final
destination of their output, in accordance to market conditions and social requirements, should
also be implemented. The diversification of the forms of agricultural commercialization, as
an alternative to monopolistic or oligopolistic forms, should also be considered. This can be
accomplished through the creation of “second degree cooperatives,” created through the
voluntary association of a group of production cooperatives to commercialize agricultural
products on their behalf, and through the authorization of direct sales by such cooperatives to
agricultural markets, the food processing industry, tourism enterprises, exporters, and other
entities in the Cuban economy. The diversification of the existing forms of agricultural
commercialization can also be achieved through the increased participation of private farmers,
the expansion of retail “points of sale,” and the inclusion of participants to include
commercialization cooperatives and enterprises, individual producers (or private farmers), and
the State procurement agency, Acopio.
Another step, or policy measure, to address the unresolved aspects that affect Cuban
agriculture, is the transformation of labor (or employment) relations to allow producers to
freely hire the amount of labor required to maintain and increase output. This requires, of
course, greater levels of producer autonomy when it comes to hiring one of the most essential
inputs in Cuban agriculture: labor. Finally, agricultural producers should be provided with the
financing necessary to support their operations, and periodic technical assistance to improve
their results and outcomes. The forms of financing provided to agricultural producers should
include short-term and long-term micro-loans, equipment loans, input financing loans, crop
revenue anticipation loans, and personal home improvement and construction, and farm
improvement loans, (Coffrey, 1998; Morvant-Roux, 2008). Technical assistance to help
no-State agricultural producers improve their results and outcomes should include some varied
forms of government extension programs, value chain development programs, certification
programs, agribusiness support programs, financial services and advisory support programs,
and programs to support enabling institutions (The Initiative for Smallholder Finance, 2014).
The implementation of these policy measures will facilitate the “realization of property,” under
which agricultural producers would enjoy greater levels of administrative and operational
autonomy and with respect to their production decisions and outcomes. Their implementation
would also allow for the utilization of the market as a complementary, but regulated, economic
coordination mechanism to achieve more rational levels of resource utilization, and higher
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levels of economic efficiency. Such process would favor the successful completion of the
agricultural production cycle, under a systematic focus.
Given its long and successful participation in important clusters of non-sugar agriculture in
Cuba, it is not surprising to find that under Cuba’s new agricultural model non-State producers
are allowed to play a larger role in the recovery and revival of this important sector of the
economy. However, the expansion of the non-State sector should be conducted in gradual and
regulated manner, particularly with regards to labor practices, the accumulation and transfer of
assets, and health and safety standards. In this context, a strong but not antagonistic State, with
the capacity to adapt and innovate, particularly on the regulatory front, but not completely
malleable by the brutal forces of market capitalism, could play a vital role to ensure and
promote agricultural self-sufficiency and national food security in Cuba.
References
Coffrey, E. (1998). Agricultural finance: Getting the policies right (Report no. 2). Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (1998). New York: United Nations.
Gaceta Oficial de Cuba. (2010). Acuerdo 6853. La Habana, Cuba. Gaceta Oficial de Cuba.
González-Corzo, M. (2013). Cuba’s agricultural transformations: Moving towards market
socialism?. In M. Font & C. Riobó(Eds.), Handbook of contemporary Cuba:
Economy, politics, civil society, and globalization (pp.97-110). Boulder, CO: Paradigm
Publishers.
González-Corzo, M, &Nova González, A. (2013). U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba:
Composition, trends, and prospects for the future. Choices, 28(4), 1-6.
Hagelberg, G.H. 2010. If it were just the “marabú: Cuba’s agriculture 2009-2010.” In J. F.
Pérez-López (Ed.), Cuba in Transition, 20. Paper presented at the 20th Annual Conference of
the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE), Miami, FL, July 29 – August 1
(pp. 32-45). Washington, DC: Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy.
Mesa-Lago, C. (2012). Cuba en la era de Raúl Castro: Reformas económico-sociales ysus
efectos. Madrid: Editorial Colibrí.
Morvant-Roux, S. (2008). What can microfinance contribute to agriculture in developing
Countries? In S. Morvant-Roux (Ed.). Proceedings from the International Conference of
the Fondation pour l’agriculure et la ruralité dans le monde ( FARM)Conference (pp. 1-20).
Paris, France. Fondation pour l’agriculure et la ruralité dansle Monde ( FARM).
Nova González, A. (2006). La agricultura en Cuba: Evolución y trayectoria (1959-2005). La
Habana, Cuba: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.
Nova González, A. (2008). El sector agropecuario en Cuba. Nueva Sociedad, 216, 77-89.
Nova González, A. (2010). Agricultura. In O. E. Pérez Villanueva (Ed.),
economía cubana: II (pp. 43-71). La Habana, Cuba: Editorial Caminos.

Miradas a la

Nova González, A. (2013). Sector agropecuario y lineamientos. In M. Font & C. Riobó(Eds.),
Handbook of contemporary Cuba: Economy, politics, civil society, and globalization
(pp. 81-96). Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
Nova González, A. (2013a).

El modelo agrícola y los lineamientos de la política económica
192

www.macrothink.org/jas

Journal of Agricultural Studies
ISSN 2166-0379
2015, Vol. 3, No. 2

y social en Cuba.

La

Habana, Cuba: Editorial Ciencias Sociales.

Nova González, A. (2013b). Un nuevo modelo cubano de gestión agrícola. Temas, 77,
84-91.
Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información (ONEI). (2014). Anuario Estadístico de Cuba,
2013. La Habana, Cuba: Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información (ONEI).
Spadoni, P. (2014). Cuba’s socialist economy today: Navigating challenges and change.
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
The Initiative for Smallholder Finance. (2014). Technical assistance for smallholder farmers:
An anatomy of the market (Briefing 07). Washington, DC.

Copyright Disclaimer
Copyright reserved by the author(s).
This article is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the
Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).

193

www.macrothink.org/jas

